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Abstract.
Abstract argumentation has been shown to be a powerful tool within many fields
such as artificial intelligence, logic and legal reasoning. In this paper we enhance
Dung’s well-known abstract argumentation framework with explanatory capabilities.
We show that an explanatory argumentation framework (EAF) obtained in this way
is a useful tool for the modeling of scientific debates. On the one hand, EAFs allow for
the representation of explanatory and justificatory arguments constituting rivaling
scientific views. On the other hand, different procedures for selecting arguments,
corresponding to different methodological and epistemic requirements of theory
evaluation, can be formulated in view of our framework.
Keywords: abstract argumentation, explanation, scientific debates, scientific rea-
soning, formal modeling
1. Introduction
Formal theories of argumentation have been extensively researched
within the fields of artificial intelligence, philosophy, logic and com-
puter science. One of the most influential accounts of argumentation is
Dung’s abstract argumentation framework (see (Dung, 1993), (Dung,
1995)). The significance of Dung’s approach derives from the fact that it
abstracts away from the nature of arguments and argumentation rules,
which allows the user to focus on the interplay of arguments rather than
on their specific structure. More precisely, an argumentation framework
(AF) consists of a set of arguments �, which are taken to be abstract
entities represented by alphabetical letters, and the binary (so-called
attack) relation � defined over this set. AFs are used to select sets
of arguments from � that satisfy certain standards of acceptability.
Selection criteria are defined in order to explicate these standards: for
instance selected sets of arguments are supposed to be non-conflicting
and to be able to defend themselves against all argumentative attacks.1
An extensive research on abstract argumentation has shown that such
systems are capable of formalizing various approaches to nonmonotonic
1 We give a formal account of this and other standard selection criteria in Section
3.
� 2011 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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2reasoning in the fields of artificial intelligence, logic programming and
human reasoning. The fruitfulness of Dung’s framework stems not only
from its abstract character, but also from the fact that it is easily en-
hanceable with additional properties and useful in different application
contexts.2
In this paper we will enhance AFs with explanatory features. The
aim of this enhancement, which we will call an Explanatory Argu-
mentation Framework (EAF), is, on the one hand, to equip AFs with
tools that can model explanatory reasoning, and on the other hand,
to demonstrate that abstract argumentation provides a useful formal
framework for the modeling of scientific debates. The basic idea of
our enhancement is to introduce to AFs a set of explananda and an
explanatory relation. This will allow us to express certain notions, such
as explanatory power and explanatory depth, in terms of our frame-
work. Moreover, we will show that EAFs allow for a comparison of
different sets of arguments in view of their explanatory virtues. Taking
into account that scientific explanation is one of the key constituents
of scientific reasoning, EAFs will turn out to be a handy modeling tool
in fields dealing with the reconstruction and the modeling of scientific
debates, such as the philosophy of science. To this end we will offer a
set of criteria which are useful for the demarcation of rivaling scientific
views in terms of arguments, as well as for an evaluation of such views in
terms of their argumentative and explanatory properties. As a result we
will be able to formulate new selection criteria, suitable for the modeling
of argumentation and explanation in a scientific context. Finally, we
will show that our approach may be embedded or linked to the argu-
mentative shift in methodology that is associated with scholars such
as Pera (see (Pera, 1994; Pera, 2000)) and Dascal (see (Dascal, 2000)).
Since a number of enhancements developed for AFs can also be applied
to EAFs, we will suggest that in this way abstract argumentation can
provide an even more refined and more realistic modeling of scientific
debates.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin in Section 2 by ex-
plicating the close relation between argumentation and explanation,
on the basis of which we will motivate the significance as well as the
structure of our framework. In Section 3 we introduce the basic notions
of abstract argumentation. In Section 4 we present EAFs. In Section 5
we informally introduce criteria and selection procedures that allow for
a more realistic representation of scientific reasoning than the standard
2 For the enhancements that have been developed for AFs see Section 7.3. As for
the different application fields, for instance, AFs have been used for an improved
account of default reasoning (Bondarenko et al., 1997), (Dung and Son, 1996), as
well as for multi-agent systems (Coste-Marquis et al., 2007), (Bench-Capon, 2003).
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3selections offered within Dung’s abstract argumentation framework. In
Section 6 we formally explicate the explanatory properties that have
been previously introduced. Section 7 offers a discussion on some addi-
tional questions concerning the virtues of our framework. We show here
that EAFs reflect some of the key ideas underlying rhetorically minded
approaches to scientific rationality, and we point out the novelties of our
framework, as well as possible enhancements of it. Section 8 concludes
the paper.
2. Argumentation and Explanation
Explanation and argumentation have been studied in philosophy of
science, epistemology and logic. While some authors have discussed the
two in close relation, others have pointed out the need to distinguish
them as two different processes of reasoning. In this section we will
explicate the relation of argumentation and explanation in our frame-
work and situate it within the broader context of the discussion on this
matter.
2.1. The Goal-Directed Perspective
One way to look at the problem of distinguishing argumentation and
explanation is to explicate what it is that explanations try to achieve.
Hughes states that
the purpose of an explanation is to show why and how some phe-
nomenon occurred or some event happened; the purpose of an ar-
gument is to show that some view or statement is correct or true.
Explanations are appropriate when the event in question is taken
for granted, and we are seeking to understand why it occurred.
Arguments are appropriate when we want to show that something
is true, usually when there is some possibility of disagreement about
its correctness. (Hughes, 1992, p. 76, italics added)
Thus, the goal of an explanation is to reach an understanding of the
why or how something occurred, depending on the type of explanation.
The occurrence itself is thereby taken for granted.
The quotation above suggests even more, namely that explanations
are distinguished from arguments due to the different types of goals
that the respective notions achieve. In contrast to explanations, argu-
ments are justificatory, they show that something is the case and not
why or how. Thus, the quotation suggests a clear distinction between
arguments and explanations. However, we will subscribe in the follow-
ing to the view that justificatory arguments are a certain subclass of
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of as a certain type of arguments as well.
2.2. Explanations as Arguments
The view that explanations are arguments has a long history. According
to Hempel’s covering law model of explanation, which is considered to
be one of the origins of the contemporary study of explanation,3 an ex-
planation is an argument in which a sentence describing a phenomenon
to be explained is derived from the class of those sentences which are
adduced to account for this phenomenon, and which contain at least one
law of nature (Hempel, 1965, p. 247). A similar view on explanations as
arguments or argument patterns can be found in unificationist accounts
of explanation (e.g. see (Kitcher, 1981), (Weber, 1999)). Moreover, the
view that some arguments have an explanatory function is not foreign
to the literature on argumentation either (e.g. see (Pera, 1994) p. 110,
(Pera, 2000) p. 57).
In order to see which type of arguments explanations are we should
first of all analyze the notion of an argument a bit more. Mayes in
his (Mayes, 2000) distinguishes between two meanings of this term: a
formal and an evidentiary one. In a broader, formal sense, an argu-
ment is a finite sequence of propositions (called premises) followed by a
proposition (called conclusion), in which the premises are intended (or
taken) to entail the conclusion (ibid., p. 363). In a narrower, evidentiary
sense, we are speaking of a specific type of formal arguments, namely
those in which premises provide a rational justification for believing
the conclusion (ibid., p. 364). This is the sense in which Hughes uses
this term and what we have called justificatory arguments. However, as
Mayes points out, beside justificatory arguments there is another type
of formal arguments: explanatory ones or simply, explanations. The ba-
sic difference between these two types of arguments, as we have already
seen, is that while justificatory ones aim at justifying that something is
the case, explanatory ones aim at answering the question why (or how)
something is the case.4
3 The contemporary study of explanation is usually seen as originating in (Hempel
and Oppenheim, 1948), which was further developed in (Hempel, 1965).
4 It is important to notice that sometimes we can determine whether a given
argument is justificatory or explanatory only by taking into account the given
context, which reveals the intention of the speaker. For example, an elliptically
expressed argument “Shops are closed today because it’s a public holiday.” – could
in one context be an explanation given in reply to the question “Why are shops
closed today?”, where the fact that shops are closed is taken for granted for both
participants involved in the conversation. In some other context though, the same
EAF.tex; 26/09/2011; 17:00; p.4
5In this sense, an explanation is a formal argument consisting of an
explanans and an explanandum, where the former one offers the causes
or the governing law of the latter one and thus provides a better under-
standing of it. That is, premises of an explanatory argument represent
an explanans from which a conclusion, representing an explanandum,
can be inferred on the basis of a certain inference relation (such as
deduction, induction, etc.).
2.3. The Processual Character of Explanations
Let us in the following put more emphasis on the notion of understand-
ing. By offering an explanation to an explainee, the explainer tries to
make the explainee understand why/how/etc. the explanandum oc-
curred. However, nothing guarantees that after offering an explanatory
argument, the explainee has actually reached the point of understand-
ing. Often an explanatory argument needs to be complemented by a
dialogical process that clarifies certain open questions or doubts on
part of the explainee. Thus, we can perceive explanations in a broader
sense to be an argumentative process aiming at the explainee’s un-
derstanding of the given phenomenon. Such a processual character of
explanations has been emphasized, for example, by Schurz who speaks
of ‘explanatory episodes’, characterized as relations between two cog-
nitive systems communicating with each other in order to achieve a
better understanding of the phenomena in question (Schurz, 1991).
An explanatory episode is considered to be a process which includes
not only explanatory arguments but may also include justificatory ar-
guments, where the task of the latter ones is to further substantiate
the former. Upon hearing an explanation, the explainee may request
further clarification and may express his doubt for some of the argu-
ments by either challenging (some of) them with counter-arguments
or by requesting further clarification. Consequently, the explainer may
have to justify claims constituting her explanation. Thus, arguing is
often a constitutive part of an explanatory process not only because
the explainer may wish to explicate and strengthen her claims, but
also because the validity of some of them may be brought into question
in case the explainee does not find them sufficiently accurate, clar-
ified, understandable, etc. Consequently, explanatory reasoning does
not have to result only in knowledge accumulation, but may sometimes
also include a revision and thus contraction of the knowledge base of
the explainee (see (Schurz, 1991)).
argument could be expressed as a justification of the fact that shops are closed,
where this fact is doubted by one of the participants.
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soning. Together with Mayes we can say that, “until an explanatory
hypothesis has been independently established through argument, it
lacks the power to support anything at all”, and the other way around,
“until a justified belief has been adequately explained it lacks the power
to support anything at all” (Mayes, 2000, p. 375). Let us take a closer
look at Mayes’ description of such an interactive relation:
Explanation is a process that is triggered by a certain kind of in-
put, viz., a surprising fact, a salient feature of our environment
that we have somehow failed to predict. (E.g., the car wont start).
. . . Explaining a fact involves the formation of a causal hypothesis
(The battery is dead.). This possible cause is the output of the
explanatory process. But for any given fact there will always be a
number of possible causes. Hence, the process of explanation will
be useful as a way of gaining predictive control over our environ-
ment only if it is supported by another process whose function is to
determine which, if any, of the possible causes should be accepted.
(ibid., p. 378).
2.4. Explanation and Argumentation in the Context of
Scientific Reasoning
In this paper we will primarily focus on the modeling of scientific
explanations, or more precisely, scientific explanatory reasoning. In
addition to the dynamics of explanation and argumentation which has
to be taken into account in such a modeling, it is important to notice
that a bilateral relation, involving one explainer and one explainee, is
not the only possible situation in an explanatory process. This is, for
instance, the case in scientific contexts where a number of scientists
can participate in a discussion on a certain explanatory issue. In such
situations, the explanation proposed by one scientist (or a group of
scientists) undergoes a critical assessment by the other members of
the given scientific community. Moreover, different scientists may offer
different, mutually rivaling explanations. As a result, arguments used
in explanatory reasoning will be open for criticism in terms of coun-
terarguments, while explanations will be open for a comparison with
other alternative explanations.
Thus, on the basis of the points presented in this section we can con-
clude that an appropriate modeling of scientific explanatory reasoning
should allow for the following three properties:5
5 Even though these properties are important for the modeling of scientific ex-
planatory reasoning, they are not restricted to it. Similar kind of requirements may
be posed on the modeling of other explanatory contexts such as e.g. expert systems.
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catory and explanatory arguments;
2. the possibility of expressing criticism in terms of counterarguments
and alternative explanations;
3. the possibility of multiple participants in an explanatory process.
In this paper we will offer a framework that can satisfy all three
of these requirements. First of all, rooting our framework in Dung’s
account of abstract argumentation allows for an abstract notion of an
argument, which can be seen as corresponding to an argument in a for-
mal sense. Consequently, both justificatory and explanatory arguments
can be represented as argumentative letters in general. Second, the dy-
namics of abstract argumentation, based on the attack relation between
arguments, allows for a modeling of counterarguments and alternative
explanations. Finally, as we will demonstrate in our examples, an ab-
stract argumentation system allows for the input from multiple parties
to be represented in an explanatory process, which further contributes
to its fitness for the modeling of scientific explanatory reasoning and
scientific debates.
Before we introduce our framework, let us give a summary of the
main concepts of Dung’s abstract argumentation.
3. Abstract Argumentation
Let us first have a look at the classical definition of argument systems
introduced by Dung in (Dung, 1995). We have a set of arguments and
an attack relation between them. The abstractness of the framework
concerns both elements. On the one hand, we do not reveal the con-
crete structure of the given arguments, but represent them by abstract
letters. On the other hand, we do not reveal the concrete nature of the
attack relation.
Definition 1. An argumentation system (AF) is a pair ��,�� where
� is a set of arguments, and � b ��� is a relation between arguments.
The expression a � b is pronounced as “a attacks b” and � is called
the attack relation.
The central notion of AFs is acceptability. We are interested in select-
ing sets of arguments, let us call them A-sets, which satisfy criteria
of acceptability.6 For example, the selected arguments should be at
least conflict-free or should be able to defend themselves from all the
attacks by other arguments. Applied to scientific discourse, an A-set
6 These were introduced by Dung as so-called “extensions”.
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methodological virtue. The following definitions introduce the standard
selection criteria for A-sets.7
Definition 2. Given an argumentation framework (AF) ��,�� and
an A-set A b � we define:
(i) A defends the argument a iff every attacker of a is attacked by a
member of A.
(ii) A is conflict-free iff no argument in A attacks an argument in A.
(iii) A is said to be defended if it is conflict-free and every argument
in A is defended by A.8
(iv) We call maximal (w.r.t. b) defended A-sets preferred A-sets.
Example 1.
We will demonstrate the concepts just introduced with
the attack-diagram to the right. The table lists the A-sets
belonging to selections based on the different criteria:
a f
b c d
conflict-free defended preferred
�,�a�,�b�,�c�,�d�, �f�,
�a, d�,�a, f�,�b, d�, �b, f�, �c, f�
�,�d�,�f�,�a, d� �a, d�,�f�
4. Enriching Abstract Argumentation with Explanations
In this section we will define explanatory argumentation frameworks
(EAFs) and some basic notions that can be expressed by them.
4.1. Explanatory Argumentation Frameworks (EAFs)
In order to equip argumentation frameworks with explanatory capabil-
ities we extend them with the following three elements:
1. A set of explananda � : we interpret elements of the set � as state-
ments describing a state of affairs which is considered to be requiring
an explanation by all the parties involved in the given dispute or which
is within the explanatory scope of a given discipline. This could be a
7 Many other selection criteria for A-sets have been proposed in the literature
(such as being “stable” and “complete” in (Bondarenko et al., 1997), being “semi-
stable” in (Caminada, 2006), being “ideal” in (Dung et al., 2007), etc.). In order to
make the technical level of the paper not too involving we stick to the selection cri-
teria introduced in Definition 2. Generalizations of our framework for other selection
criteria are straight-forward.
8 Defended A-sets are also often labeled “admissible”.
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accordance with the standard view on explanations which take the ex-
planandum as indisputable in character (in contrast to the conclusions
of evidentiary arguments), we assume that the set of explananda con-
sists of facts which are considered to be indisputable in the given field.
For example, an explanandum can be a description of, or a reference
to a certain observation or an experimental result.9
2. The second element we need to introduce is an explanatory relation
� which holds between:
(a) an argument and an explanandum, i.e., � b � �� where � is the
set of arguments of a given AF and � is the set of explananda;
(b) between two arguments, i.e., � b � ��.
Where a > � and x > � � � we designate “a�x” as “a explains x”.
While the explanatory relation between an argument and an explanan-
dum links phenomena requiring explanation with the reasons which
should allow for their better understanding, the explanatory relation
between arguments themselves allows for explanations to be deepened.
In other words, argument b can be used to explain one of the premises
of argument a (which may itself be used to explain explanandum e)
or the link between the premises and the conclusion. The former case
corresponds to Thagard’s idea of a deepening of scientific explanations
or Bermu´dez’s notion of a vertical explanation.10 The latter case can
occur in explanatory situations typical for everyday language, didactic
situations or oral disputes, in which arguments are usually expressed in
an elliptic manner so that the link between premises and the conclusion
might not be sufficiently clear. In accordance with the abstract char-
acter of abstract argumentation frameworks, we treat the explanatory
relation in an abstract manner as well.
3. We introduce the third element that simplifies the modeling of
scientific debates while making it at the same time more accurate.
Sometimes two arguments a and b are based on incompatible pre-
suppositions or premises. It is important to notice that this does not
necessarily indicate that a attacks b or vice versa. This is often the case
with alternative explanations of a certain phenomenon. For instance,
some geologists in the first half of the twentieth century explained the
origin of mountains by the idea of continental drift (g), while some other
geologists explained it by the thesis of the earth’s contraction (c). Al-
though g and c were clearly incompatible (see Example 2, Section 4.2),
9 Nevertheless, sometimes there are disputes on what is to count as a valid or
important explanandum in a given scientific field. For the possibility of enhancing
our framework so that it can allow for such disputes, see Section 7.3.
10 We will present both notions in Section 6.
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g in itself was not sufficient to attack c (and vice versa): just naming
an alternative explanation is not considered as a counter-argument in
a scientific debate. And indeed, counter-arguments against both ideas
were established on independent grounds. For instance, contractionists
attacked the theory of drifters by pointing out that it cannot account for
a mechanism that would enable continents to plough through the dense
seafloor. In order to model such incompatibilities between arguments
we introduce another relation, the incompatibility relation .
In conclusion, we define:
Definition 3. An Explanatory Argumentation Framework (EAF) is a
tuple ��,� ,�,�,�, where ��,�� is an AF, � is a set of explananda,
� b �� �� � � �� ���, and  b � �� is a symmetric relation.
We call � the explanatory relation and the elements of � atomic
explanations. The elements of � are denoted by e, e1, e2, ..., and the
elements of � by a, b, c, d, f, g, .... Moreover,  is the incompatibility
relation and in case a  b, a and b are said to be incompatible.
Concerning the selection criteria introduced in Definition 2 little
adjustment is needed. The only change concerns the notion of conflict-
freeness: In the remainder of the paper we call an A-set A conflict-free
iff no argument in A attacks or is incompatible with an argument in
A. As before, A is said to be defended if it is conflict-free and every
argument in A is defended by A.
4.2. Basic Definitions
In order to introduce some basic notions it is useful to first define some
basic graph-theoretic concepts.
Definition 4. A directed graph (digraph) is an ordered pair G � �V,��
where V is a set and � is a binary relation on V , � b V � V . The
elements of V are called vertices and the elements of � are called
arrows. G� � �V �,��� is a sub-graph of G iff V � b V , �� b V � � V � and
�
�
b �. G� is a proper sub-graph of G iff it is a sub-graph of G and
V � ` V or �� ` �. We say that there is a path from x1 to xn in G iff
there are x1, . . . , xn > V for which �xi, xi�1� > � for all 1 B i  n. G
is circular iff there is an x > V for which there is a path from x to x.
Where V � b V , we define �V ��df ��x, y� >� � x, y > V ��.
We now introduce definitions that characterize explanations in EAFs.
Definition 5. Let A � ��,� ,�,�,� be an EAF, e > � , and a > �.
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(i) We call a sub-graph X � �A,�A� of ��,��� an explanation of e
iff there is a unique argument a > A such that (i) a� e and (ii)
there is a path in X from every a� > A � �a� to a.
We say that the explanation X is circular if X is a circular graph.
We use the following writing conventions: In the case that an ex-
planationX only consists of a path �P,�P �, where P � �a1, . . . , an�
and �P � ��ai�1, ai� � 1 B i  n�, we abbreviate X by �a1, . . . , an�.
We sometimes write X�e� for X in order to indicate that X
explains e.
(ii) An explanation �A,�A� is conflict-free iff A is conflict-free.
(iii) An explanation X�e� is deeper than an explanation X ��e� iff X �
is a proper sub-graph of X. We write X � h X. We say that X � is
a sub-explanation of X.
(iv) X�e� andX ��e� are alternative explanations of e iff neitherX hX �
nor X � hX.
(v) An explanation �B,�B� is offered by an A-set A iff B b A. We
define the set of all explananda for which A offers an explanation
by
ǫ�A� �df �e > � � there is an explanation X�e� offered by A�.
Example 2. We give an example of a scientific debate, on the basis
of which we can clarify the notions that have so far been introduced,
and which will serve to show why and how our framework can be useful
in an evaluation of scientific theories. The following arguments, which
correspond to the EAF given in Figure 2, are central to (though they do
not exhaust) an important discussion in the geological sciences around
the 1920’s. This debate marked the beginning of a scientific revolution
which was initiated by Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental drift
(henceforth, the Drift), and resulted in the theory of plate tectonics
(see e.g. (Le Grand, 1988)). Wegener started off by suggesting that
his theory is superior compared to two already existing theories –
contractionism and permanentism.
Scientific debates are often very technical and complex. Hence, in
order to follow them a scholar has to be sufficiently familiar with the
involved topics. We chose this example since the technical complexity of
the given arguments allows for a representation that is understandable
and transparent also for scholars that are not already familiar with the
subtleties of the research in geology at that time and it is thus ideal as
a running example for demonstrating our framework. We begin with an
excerpt of the arguments given by drifters and contractionists, which
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will be further extended at a later point in this paper (see Example 3).
The explananda are as follows:11
e1 (fossils) Similar kinds of fossils were found on different continents.12
e2 (orogeny) There are mountains and mountain chains on conti-
nents.
e3 (glaciation) There is an evidence of glaciation which took place
in the late Paleozoic in the southern continents (the so-called
Southern Glaciation or the late Paleozoic glaciation).
The following arguments were offered:
a (land bridges) In the past, the continents were apart like nowa-
days, but connected by land bridges. This is how different species
of flora and fauna were distributed to different parts of the world.
b (no land bridges nowadays) The hypothesis of the land bridges
is not plausible since it is not clear how such land bridges would
have disappeared throughout the history.
c (contraction) Vertical displacements of the otherwise unmovable
earth’s crust result from the contraction of the earth, which causes
shrinking and lateral compression in the crust. That is why some
rocks (such as mountains) became elevated while some others (such
as the land bridges) subsided into the ocean.
d (cooling) The earth is contracting due to its cooling.
f (drift-paleontology) Continents were once connected into a super-
continent, before they drifted away from each other. Different species
of flora and fauna were distributed over different continents in this
way.
g (drift-orogeny) Drifting of continents results in the leading edge of
the continent being compressed and folded upwards due to the re-
sistance of the seafloor. Consequently, mountains are being formed
along the leading coastlines of a drifting continent, or result from
two continents colliding against each other.
h (drift-glaciation) The nowadays southern continents were once a
part of a super-continent, and positioned more in the north. That
11 Even though we will, for the sake of simplicity, focus on some arguments
exchanged between the drifters and the contractionists, it is important to notice
that the permanentist side could easily be included in our example, and that EAFs
are suitable for the modeling of any number of parties involved in an explanatory
process.
12 This is a simplified version of the actual explanandum, which states a pecu-
liar distribution of Cambrian trilobites – fossil arthropods that lived 500 to 600
million years ago (see (Gould, 1977)); we will make similar simplifications of other
explananda and arguments constituting this example in order to avoid burdening
the reader with too many technical details.
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is why glaciation could occur on them in Paleozoic, before they
drifted to the south.
i (drift) The earth consists of concentric shells, the density of which
increases from the crust to the core, so that the continents float on
and extend into the ocean floors. This is why the continents, pulled
by a particular (currently unknown) force, could drift away from
their original locations where they once formed a super-continent.
d
cooling
c
contraction
b
no land
bridges nowadays
a
land bridges
e1
fossils
i
drift
f
drift-
paleontology
g
drift-
orogeny
h
drift-
glaciation
e2
orogeny
e3
glaciation
Figure 2. The EAF of Example 2. Solid arrows represent the attack relation, dotted
arrows represent the explanatory relation, and solid lines represent the incompati-
bility relation. Solid lines from the box around arguments f, g and h to argument a
and the box around d and c indicate that all three arguments are incompatible with
a, d and c. The explanatory arrow from i to the box around f , g and h indicates
that each of the three arguments is explained by i.
Let us focus on maximal conflict-free sets of arguments that are
able to defend themselves in order to gain a first approximative rep-
resentation of the rivaling scientific views.13 Hence, we are interested
in preferred A-sets. In this example we have two such A-sets: A1 �
�f,h, g, i� and A2 � �a, c, d�, corresponding to the two represented
rivaling views in geology: Drift and contractionism. Next, we have
two atomic explanations of e1: a and f , two atomic explanations of
e2: c and g, and one atomic explanation of e3: h. Each of them is
a sub-explanation of the following explanations, resp.: X1�e1� � �a�,
X2�e1� � �f, i�, X3�e2� � �c, d�, X4�e2� � �g, i�, and X5�e3� � �h, i�
all of which are conflict-free and non-circular. By Definition 5iv, �g, i�
is deeper than �g� alone. Explanations X2,X4 and X5 are offered by
the drifters, i.e. A1, and explanations X1 and X3 are offered by the
contractionists, i.e. A2. Notice that the two preferred A-sets, A1 and
13 We will offer more realistic selection procedures for the representation of
scientific views in Section 5.
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A2, offer explanations for different sets of explananda: while A2 offers
explanations for e1 and e2, A1 offers explanations for e1, e2 and e3.
Hence, while the two A-sets are in view of their argumentative proper-
ties equivalent (i.e. they are both maximally defended and conflict-free),
their explanatory power is different. Since a difference in the explana-
tory power of A-sets can play an important role in the evaluation of
scientific theories, we will introduce criteria for selecting A-sets in view
of their explanatory features in Sections 5 and 6.
This example also demonstrates the usefulness of our incompatibil-
ity relation. We take the contractionists’ arguments a, c and d to be
incompatible with all of the explanations given in view of the Drift
(f ,g,h and i) since they assume mutually incompatible explanatory
mechanisms.14 Obviously, argument d refers to the level of cooling
that can account for the level of contraction needed to explain the
formation of mountains (e2), and not to a more moderate version of
cooling and contracting, which would not be able to explain such a
phenomenon and which would be compatible with the Drift. Notice
that without our incompatibility relation, the arguments of the two
sides would have to be modeled either as formally unrelated in terms
of EAFs or as related in terms of bidirectional attacks (in place of
the incompatibility relations). However, in the first case, it would be
impossible to distinguish between the two rivaling scientific views, since
for instance �a, c, d, f, g, h, i� would be a conflict-free A-set. The second
option would allow for the distinction between the rivaling views, but
it would have some other implausible results. For example, argument
b would be taken as defended from c by any of the Drift arguments
f, g, h, i merely due to the fact that an alternative explanation has
been proposed, which would be counterintuitive.
5. Towards a More Realistic Modeling of Scientific Debates
5.1. Criteria for the Modeling of Scientific Debates
As we have seen in Section 4, certain criteria for A-sets (such as being
conflict-free or defended) are useful for the representation of opposing
views in scientific debates. However, for a more realistic modeling of
14 For example, one of the reasons for this incompatibility (which for the sake
of simplicity we have kept out of our examples) lies in the fact that Drift relied
on the principle of isostasy, which implied that continents and ocean floors had to
be different either in structure or in composition, and which conflicted with the
contractionists’ idea of interchangeability of oceans and continents (Oreskes, 1999,
p. 21-55).
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scientific views and their evaluation, we need to add few more criteria
and modify some of those that have already been introduced. We will
show that some of the key epistemic values relevant in the evaluation of
scientific theories can be expressed in terms of our framework. On the
basis of them, we will be able to formulate selection types for A-sets that
reflect certain methodological and epistemic preferences scientists or
philosophers may have when evaluating theories in view of the available
arguments. We will propose two procedures for such selections, which
are more apt for this purpose than the standard criteria introduced in
Section 3.
It is important to mention though that it is beyond the scope of this
paper to finally settle the question, which criteria (and combinations
thereof) most adequately capture the methodological and epistemic
standards used in theory evaluation, either descriptively or normatively.
Many new criteria have been studied since Dung developed his AFs,
which refine and optimize the first generation of selection criteria in
many ways.15 It is a task left for future research to clarify which
(combinations of) criteria are the most suitable for the modeling of
the notions of acceptability underlying theory choice. What we want
to present here is rather a general directive for how this research may
proceed and in which way notions developed in terms of EAFs can be
useful for this task.
The criterion of conflict-freeness, introduced in the previous section,
is a minimal requirement that should be satisfied by A-sets representing
a given scientific view. In view of this criterion we can then distinguish
between mutually rivaling scientific views. Another epistemic standard
significant in the evaluation of scientific theories is their explanatory
power.
Explanatory power. The explanatory power of an A-set – usu-
ally also referred to as explanatory scope or explanatory breadth – is
given by the set of explananda which are explained by its constitut-
ing arguments. We are interested in sufficiently explanatory powerful
(conflict-free) A-sets. There are two ways of comparing the explanatory
power that may be relevant in the assessment of scientific theories. On
the one hand, if an A-set has a (clearly) smaller explanatory scope
compared to another A-set, then it is usually considered to be a sub-
optimal candidate in the context of theory acceptance (other things
being equal). On the other hand, when we are evaluating whether a
new scientific theory is worthy of pursuit, it may be enough for an A-
set to have some novel explanations, i.e. to explain certain explananda
that are not explained by any alternative A-set. Therefore it will be
15 See Footnote 7.
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useful to introduce two ways of comparing the explanatory power of
A-sets: on the one hand in a quantitative sense and on the other hand
in a qualitative sense. We will discuss them in more detail in Section
6.1. Since the aim of this section is to present the main idea underlying
our new criteria, we will use only a simplified version of the latter
comparison type which we informally define as follows:
We say that an A-set A1 is explanatory more powerful than an A-
set A2 iff the set of explananda for which the arguments in A1 offer an
explanation is a proper super-set of the set of explananda for which A2
offers an explanation (i.e., ǫ�A2� ` ǫ�A1�).
Example 3. In order to get a more accurate picture of the discussion
in geological sciences presented in Example 2, we extend it with some
additional arguments. The EAF corresponding to the example is given
in Figure 3.
j (mechanism-problem) It is not at all clear how the continental
drift can occur, since continents cannot simply plough through
the dense seafloor.
k (radioactivity) Due to the discovery of radioactive material in the
earth’s crust, which produces heat when decaying, we can claim
that the earth cannot be cooling, at least not to such an extent
that would account for the origin of higher mountain chains.
l (why contracting?) It is not plausible to assume that the earth is
contracting unless we know the causes of such a process, and no
such cause seems to exist.
d
cooling
c
contraction
b
no land
bridges nowadays
a
land bridges
e1
fossils
k
radioactivity
l
why contracting?
j
mechanism-problem
i
drift
f
drift-
paleontology
g
drift-
orogeny
h
drift-
glaciation
e2
orogeny
e3
galciation
Figure 3. The EAF from Example 3.
The most explanatory conflict-free A-sets are various super-sets of
A1 � �f, g, h�, e.g. A2 � �f, g, h, i, l�,A3 � �b, f, g, h, k, l�,A4 � �b, f, g, h�,
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etc. Note that any conflict-free super-set of �a, c� (i.e. A-sets repre-
senting contractionism) only explains �e1, e2� and is hence explanatory
weaker than A1, . . . ,A4. Indeed, given the arguments introduced so far,
the Drift offers a broader explanatory scope than Contractionism.
However, it is important to notice that in this example none of the
most explanatory A-sets, such as A1, . . . ,A4, are defended in a strict
sense: after all neither of these sets is able to defend itself from the
attack by j. The only preferred A-set is A�1 � �b, j, k, l�. Nevertheless,
this set has no explanatory power with respect to the given explananda.
Note that the two preferred A-sets from Example 2 – �f, g, h, i� and
�a, c, d� – both offer a greater explanatory power than A�1. However,
they are not anymore selected, since they are not able to defend them-
selves from all the attacks. This situation is not atypical in science since
many theories that are accepted or pursued are confronted with objec-
tions and criticisms of various kinds, from which they cannot always
immediately be defended. This is especially so in the context of pursuit
where we are primarily interested in a theory that can offer explana-
tions for certain phenomena in spite of having some open problems. For
example, during the confrontation of the above mentioned geological
theories, the fact that none of them was resistant against criticism was
not a sufficient reason for abandoning their further pursuit. Hence,
in certain epistemic contexts we might wish to lower our standard of
defense, that requires from an A-set to defend itself from all attacks.
Weakening the Standard of Defense. The idea of this weakening
is to say that an A-set A1 is more defended than another A-set A2 iff
A2 is attacked by more arguments against which it cannot defend itself
than A1.
16
Let us take a look at the most explanatory A-sets from Example 3.
A2 is attacked by both j and d. Similarly, A4 is attacked by j and c.
The A-sets A3, A5 � �f, g, h, i�, and A6 � �f, g, h, i, k� fair better: they
are only attacked by j. The latter sets belong to the most defended of
the most explanatory A-sets.
Explanatory Depth. In addition to comparing sets of arguments
in view of their explanatory power, we can also compare them in view
of their explanatory depth. For instance, both �f, g, h� and �f, g, h, i�
have the same explanatory breadth since both offer explanations for all
the shared explananda e1, e2 and e3. However, �f, g, h, i� is explanatory
deeper than �f, g, h� since i explanatory deepens arguments f, g and
16 This is still, of course, a very rough account of the degree of being defended. It
would get more realistic if we took into consideration a weighting of the attacks, since
some attacks may be considered as more severe than others (see also our Discussion
in Section 7.3).
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h. Note that the latter are not shared explananda but theory-internal
parts of the Drift. Since we are interested in representing a scientific
view as consisting not only of the arguments that directly explain
the shared explananda (e.g. �f, g, h��, but also the arguments that
explanatory deepen the former, this criterion could be of use as well.
We will give a more precise definition of this notion in Section 6.2.
5.2. Selection Procedures for New Types of A-Sets
On the basis of the newly introduced criteria, we are now able to ex-
press selection procedures that correspond to certain types of epistemic
evaluation of scientific theories, that is, views of scientists participating
in scientific debates.
Procedure 1. The underlying idea of this procedure is to select the
argumentative core of the most explanatory scientific views or theories
together with arguments that are used for attacking their rivals. It
consists of the following steps:
1. Select all the conflict-free A-sets.
2. Out of these, select the most explanatory A-sets.
3. Out of these, select the most defended A-sets.
4. Out of these, select the maximal A-sets (w.r.t. set-inclusion).
Applied to our example, the procedure delivers the A-set �b, f, g, h, i, l, k�.
First, by selecting conflict-free A-sets, we make sure that we distinguish
between the rivaling theories. Second, we choose from these the most
explanatory powerful ones. Third, by choosing the most defended ones
of these, we select the least problematic of the explanatory powerful the-
ories. Finally, by choosing the maximal ones from the latter selection,
we make sure we include as many mutually compatible arguments as
possible, thus also including those which are used to attack the rivaling
theories.
Procedure 2. The idea underlying this procedure is to select the
explanatory core of the most explanatory theories.
1. Select all the conflict-free A-sets.
2. Out of these, select the most explanatory A-sets.
3. Out of these, select the most defended A-sets.
4. Out of these, select the explanatory deepest A-sets.
5. Out of these, select the minimal A-sets (w.r.t. set-inclusion).
In the first three steps we proceed analogous to Procedure 1. By select-
ing the explanatory deepest A-sets we want to make sure we include
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the explanatory gist of the given theory. Finally, by choosing the min-
imal of these, we preserve only those arguments belonging to such
an explanatory core, while disregarding, for example, the arguments
used only for attacking the rivaling theories, i.e. arguments that don’t
have an explanatory or defensive function. Applied to our example this
procedure delivers the A-set �f, g, h, i� (as the reader can easily verify).
Even though both of our procedures prioritize the criterion of ex-
planatory power to the criterion of defense, in some contexts we may
wish to reverse this order, and even use the full defense criterion. For
instance, when evaluating which theories should be accepted (and not
only pursued), we may want to allow only for theories that can be
fully defended. Such a procedure would begin with the selection of
defended A-sets, followed by the selection of the most explanatory ones
of these. Obviously, by different combinations of the criteria we may
obtain different procedures suitable for different epistemic contexts.
Let us also remark that the procedures offered above are of a sequen-
tial or vertical nature: selections with respect to various criteria are
applied step-wise. It is also possible to select “horizontally” by making
use of weighting functions for A-sets. Let us give a simple example.
Given an EAF ��,� ,�,�,� and a conflict-free A-set A we define:
π�A� � µd
� �α�A��
� �
� µe
�ǫ�A��
� �
,
where α�A� is the set of attackers of A against which it cannot de-
fend itself. Moreover, µd and µe are numerical weights that model the
importance we attach to the criteria defendedness and explanatory
power respectively. Let us apply π to some A-sets from Example 3
where µd � µe � 1: for the Drift we have e.g. π��b, f, g, h, i, k, l�� �
π��i, f, g, h�� � 10
11
�
3
3
, while for contractionism we have π��a, c, d, j�� �
π��a, c, d�� � 10
11
�
2
3
. Of course, horizontal and vertical selection mech-
anisms may be combined. For instance, we could first select A-sets
that maximize π and then select the maximal ones out of these. In the
example above we would end up with �b, f, g, h, i, k, l�.
In the following section we will give a more precise formal represen-
tation of the comparisons in view of explanatory power and explanatory
depth, which will also allow for a refinement of different aspects of these
two procedures.
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6. A Formal Account of Explanatory Properties
6.1. Explanatory Power
Let us now properly define the two ways of comparing the explanatory
power of A-sets that have been introduced in the previous section and
point out possible refinements for each of them.
Definition 6. Comparing the explanatory power in a qualitative sense:
A is explanatory stronger than A�, in signs A� Xe A, iff the set of
explananda for which A offers an explanation is a super-set of the set
of explananda for which A� offers an explanation: ǫ�A�� ` ǫ�A�. This
notion was used in Section 5.
Definition 7. Comparing the explanatory power in a quantitative sense:
A is explanatory stronger than A�, in signs A� Xc A, iff A explains
numerically more explananda than A�: �ǫ�A���  �ǫ�A��.17
Example 4. Let ��,� ,�,�,� be an EAF where � � �e1, . . . , e10�.
Let A and A� be preferred A-sets for which ǫ�A� � �e1, . . . e8� and
ǫ�A�� � �e6, . . . , e10�. Note that A� Xc A since A explains 8 out of 10
explananda butA� only explains 5. However, A� �Xe A since ǫ�A�� �` ǫ�A�.
Sometimes the comparative measures of explanatory power offered
in Definitions 6 and 7 are too strict. To see this suppose that there
is a third preferred A-set A�� in our Example 4 for which ǫ�A��� �
�e4, . . . , e10�. Note that A
��
Xc A. However, A numerically explains only
one explanandum more than A��. Often if the explanatory power of two
theories is not very different this is not a sufficient reason for preferring
one over the other.
For a more refined approach to representing both comparative no-
tions of explanatory power, we generalize them by introducing a thresh-
old value τ . For the quantitative notion we define A Xτc A� iff �ǫ�A��� �
�ǫ�A�� A τ where τ is a constant. Note that X0c is equivalent to Xc. By
introducing a threshold value τ , for instance 1, both A-sets A and A��
are equally explanatory strong with respect to X1c . This introduces an
interesting option for the modeling of states in science where different
scientific groups are characterized by similarly strong, but nevertheless
incompatible explanatory features. It is easy to see that Xe can be
generalized in a similar way using threshold values.
17 It is easy to see that �c and �e are strict preorders on ���� � ����. (A strict
preorder is a irreflexive and transitive binary relation.) Obviously A �e A� implies
A �c A
�.
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Example 5. Let us return to our Example 3. Take for instance the
two conflict-free A-sets: A7 � �a, c, d� and A8 � �b, f, g, h, i�. It is easy
to see that A8 has a greater explanatory power than A7 since it offers
an explanation of e1, e2, and e3, while A7 only offers an explanation of
e1 and e2. Formally speaking, A7 Xe A8 as well as A7 Xc A8.
Nevertheless, the explanatory power of the two A-sets in question
is similar (although in our simplified modeling ǫ�A7� ` ǫ�A8�): A8 ex-
plains only one explanandum more than A7. By introducing a threshold
τ � 1, we obtain both extensions – A7 and A8 – as maximal elements
of X1c (with respect to all conflict-free A-sets): due to their high and
similar explanatory power they are both acceptable according to this
notion. Such a rendering would correspond, for instance, to the view
that geology in the first half of the twentieth century was in a multi-
paradigm state where both contractionism and the Drift (as well as
permanentism) were mutually rivaling paradigms (see e.g. (Stewart,
1990, p. 139)), in contrast to the above, strict rendering which corre-
sponds to the preference on the Drift as a more explanatory powerful
conception. This is due to the fact that the explanatory power of the
two camps was very similar such that, given an appropriate threshold
τ , also for a more complete and realistic modeling of this debate, A-sets
representing both views would be selected.
6.2. Explanatory Depth
As we have seen in the previous section, we can also compare A-sets
with respect to their explanatory depth. This is important, for instance,
in cases in which we have two A-sets with the same explanatory power,
but one of which offers a deeper explanation of some explananda than
the other one. The formal definition of explanatory depth is as follows:
Definition 8. Given two A-sets A1 and A2, we say that A2 is explana-
tory at least as deep as A1, in signs A1 Zd A2 iff for every explanation
X1�e� of e > ǫ�A1� offered by A1 there is an explanation X2�e� offered
by A2 such that X1 h X2 or X1 � X2. We say that A2 is explanatory
deeper than A1, written A1 Xd A2, iff A1 Zd A2 but it is not the case
that A2 Zd A1.
For instance, in Example 3, �f, g, h, i� is explanatory deeper than
�f, g, h�.
In addition to their application in the selection procedures men-
tioned in the previous section, our criteria for explanatory power and
explanatory depth may be interesting in capturing some philosoph-
ical notions as well. For example, Thagard’s concepts of broadening
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– explaining new facts, and deepening – explaining why the theory
works (Thagard, 2007, p. 29) correspond to our notions of explana-
tory power and explanatory depth. Similarly, we can account for the
notions of “horizontal” and “vertical explanations” (see (Bermu´dez,
2005)) by representing them, respectively, with our notions of primary
explanation and its deepening.18
7. Discussion
In this section we address questions that are relevant for situating
our framework in the broader context of philosophy of science and
methodology, Dung’s abstract argumentation, as well as in the context
of other formal accounts of explanatory reasoning. Therefore we shall
clarify the relevance and the novelties of EAFs, as well as some possible
enhancements.
7.1. EAFs and the Argumentative Shift in Methodology
Discussions in the field of philosophy of science and scientific method-
ology in the last couple of decades have witnessed a growing conviction
that a rule-based algorithmic approach to theory appraisal is problem-
atic. One possible attempt to preserve the normative idea of rationality
in spite of abandoning the idea of a static, universally applicable scien-
tific method can be found in more rhetorically minded approaches to
scientific reasoning, such as Pera’s (1994)19 or Dascal’s (2000). Instead
of an algorithmic assessment of scientific theories, Pera and Dascal em-
phasize the evaluation in view of the argumentative context underlying
the given episode in the history of science. Similarly, Longino points out
that a “method must [. . . ] be understood as a collection of social, rather
than individual, processes, so the issue is the extent to which a scientific
community maintains critical dialogue” (Longino, 1990, p. 76). While
formal approaches to scientific reasoning have been mainly focused
on the logical form of arguments (that is, the nature of the inference
18 According to Bermu´dez, a “horizontal explanation is the explanation of a par-
ticular event or state in terms of distinct (and usually temporarily antecedent) events
or states.” (Bermu´dez, 2005, p. 32). For example, a horizontal explanation providing
an answer to the question why the window broke when it did, might call upon the
baseball’s hitting it and a generalization about windows tending to break when hit
by a baseball. However, if we ask why the mentioned generalization holds, that is,
what features of the physical structure of glass make it fragile in such circumstances
– we are asking for an explanation of the grounds of the given horizontal explanation.
Such explanations Bermu´dez calls vertical explanations (ibid, p. 32-33).
19 Pera is inspired by Kuhn’s notion of persuasion (Kuhn, 1962).
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relation), both Pera and Dascal show that scientific debates (Dascal’s
controversies) are typically not resolved by the derivational reason-
ing that is characteristic for logic but rather by scientists exchanging
arguments and trying to convince each other by giving reasons that
substantiate their points:
The contenders pile up arguments they believe increase the weight of
their positions vis a vis the adversaries’ objections, thereby leading,
if not to deciding the matter in question, at least to tilting the
‘balance of reason’ in their favor. Controversies are neither ‘solved’
nor ‘dissolved’; they are resolved. Their resolution may consist in
the acknowledgment (by the contenders or by their community of
reference) that enough weight has been accumulated in favor of one
of their positions, or in the emergence (thanks to the controversy)
of modified positions acceptable to the contenders, or simply in the
mutual clarification of the nature of the differences at stake. (Dascal,
2000, p. 165, italics added)
Our account of EAFs is supposed to mirror the idea underlying such
an argumentative approach to scientific controversies in a formal way.
Various possible enhancements (which will be mentioned in subsection
7.3) allow for a framework that reflects such a rhetorically minded
approach to scientific debates in a more refined way. However, in con-
trast to an informal analysis such as Pera’s Dialectics, which deals
with rhetorical aspects of arguments in scientific debates in terms of
classifying argument types and explicating their roles, our approach
abstracts from the concrete type of arguments by focusing only on
their roles as being attacks or explanations. This allows us to inhabit
a formal middle-ground for the modeling of the “tilting of the ‘balance
of reason’” by means of selection procedures defined with the help of
our framework. Thus, EAFs (and more generally speaking, abstract
argumentation) can be considered to complement the informal theories
of argumentation by representing a formal tool that can serve to ra-
tionally reconstruct scientific debates from an argumentative point of
view.
7.2. The Novelty of EAFs
What are the main novelties of our framework? This question should
be answered in view of the research done in abstract argumentation
frameworks, as well as in view of other formal accounts of explanatory
reasoning.
With regard to the former, it could be argued that since our ex-
planatory arrow is a kind of support relation, systems such as the
bipolar one (see (Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex, 2005)), which also fea-
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ture an argumentative support relation, might be sufficient to model
the notions introduced by our framework (such as explanations, ex-
planatory power, explanatory depth, etc.). Nevertheless, the presence
of the set of explananda � in EAFs makes an important difference.
Placing explananda outside of the set of arguments makes it possible
not only to express notions such as the explanatory power of an A-set,
but also to represent alternative explanations of the same phenomenon
and to compare the explanatory virtues of different A-sets. Moreover,
on the basis of such an enhancement we are able to formulate new
selection types in view of explanatory properties of the arguments,
which are more suitable for the evaluation of scientific views than the
standard Dung’s selection types. Thus, our explanatory relation cannot
be substituted by the already existing support relation.
With regard to other formal accounts of explanatory reasoning, it
is important to notice that there are different levels of abstraction on
which formal representations can be based. First of all, we can formally
analyze explanatory reasoning by focusing on the nature of the infer-
ential relation present in explanations. This will give us, for instance,
logical systems of abduction (see e.g. (Aliseda, 2006)). Next, we can
obtain formal representations by abstracting away from the logical
properties of explanatory reasoning and focusing on the explanatory
coherence of the propositions constituting a certain cognitive system.
Thagard’s account of explanatory coherence (?) and its implementation
in the computer program ECHO is an example of such an approach.20
Finally, if we abstract away from the propositional level, we can repre-
sent explanatory reasoning in terms of arguments taken in an abstract
sense of the term, that is, without analyzing the specific type of in-
ferential relations involved in them. This kind of approach is the one
employed in EAFs. An important merit of such an approach is that it
allows for a transparent representation of scientific debates, while at the
20 It is important to notice that even though both Thagard’s explanatory coher-
ence and our EAFs aim at modeling the comparison of cognitive systems in terms
of their explanatory virtues, there is a number of differences between these two ac-
counts. For example, while the basic unit of Thagard’s coherentism is a proposition,
our framework is constituted of arguments and explananda; while Thagard’s notion
of acceptability is defined in terms of explanatory coherence, we speak of differ-
ent types of acceptability, defined in terms of defensibility and certain explanatory
properties; while Thagard does not model the dynamics of argumentation and thus
cannot model the idea of an argumentative defense, we can; while the distinction of
the evaluation of theories in the context of pursuit and in the context of acceptance is
not explicated in his account, we have shown that such a distinction can be made in
EAFs; finally, our graphical representation is quite different from Thagard’s and may
be considered as more transparent when it comes to the representation of scientific
debates.
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same time offering handy tools for evaluating A-sets in view of their
argumentative properties (e.g. being conflict-free and defended) and
explanatory virtues. Moreover, by abstracting away from the specific
nature of inferential relations in argumentative reasoning, we are able
to model debates in which not every argument is necessarily based
on a valid inference (and which may lead to it being attacked by a
counterargument). Hence, by applying such an approach to scientific
reasoning, we have not only introduced a novelty in the field of ab-
stract argumentation, but also in the field of formal representations of
scientific reasoning, which has, to our knowledge, so far not been linked
with argumentation in an abstract sense of the term.21
7.3. Enhancing EAFs
In order to allow for an even more realistic modeling of scientific de-
bates, our framework can be enhanced in different ways. For example,
we can easily introduce a support relation (presented in (Cayrol and
Lagasquie-Schiex, 2005)) which runs over the set of arguments.22 An-
other interesting enhancement would be to introduce a weighting on
arguments (by means of values (Bench-Capon, 2002), (Bench-Capon,
2003), preferences (Amgoud and Cayrol, 1998), or audiences (Bench-
Capon et al., 2007)), evidential support (Oren and Norman, 2008),
or to introduce different types of joint attacks (Nielsen and Parsons,
2006) or fuzziness (Janssen et al., 2008) that allows, for instance, for the
relaxation of the standards of being conflict-free and of being defended.
Introducing nested attacks in a hierarchical manner into EAFs (see
(Modgil, 2006; Modgil, 2009)) would allow for a formal distinction and
an analysis of the interplay between arguments given on the object level
and methodological arguments addressing the former ones. Moreover,
our explanatory relation could be refined by formally distinguishing
between two types of deepening explicated in Section 4.1. Similarly
to the above mentioned nested attacks, we could allow for a nested
explanatory relation: a� b would in that case indicate that a explains
one of the premises of b, while a��b� c� would indicate that a explains
the explanatory link between b and c.
21 Even though in this paper we have been primarily concerned with scientific
explanations, philosophy of science is not the only novel domain in which abstract
argumentation in terms of EAFs may be fruitfully applied. Another interesting
application field is expert systems. For example, Moulin et al. (Moulin et al., 2002)
argue that in order to justify and ”convince their users of the validity of their
recommendations . . . , artificial agents should also be equipped with explanation
and argumentation capabilities.” (p. 172).
22 After all, there are types of argumentative supports that are not explanatory
in nature and can hence not be represented by means of our explanatory relation.
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Another possible enhancement is related to the property of our
framework that explananda are not supposed to be a matter of dispute.
Even though this is often so, there are rare cases in which not all
involved parties agree about what is to count as a significant or even
valid explanandum in the given field. For example, some geologists
criticized Wegener for pointing out that his theory of continental drift
explained the jigsaw-fit of continental coastlines, since such a match
was, according to them, not at all obvious and did not represent a
significant explanandum for geological sciences. In order to model such
disputes, EAFs could be enhanced by allowing preferences or values on
explananda, so that different opinions of scientists can be represented
in that way. However, if we want to model cases in which explananda
can be rejected as invalid on an argumentative basis, that is, if we
want to allow for a dispute on explananda we could enhance EAFs by
allowing attack relation to run not only over arguments, but also to go
from arguments to explananda (that is, � b �� ���� �). As a result,
explananda could be both criticized and defended, while the modeling
of explanatory virtues would have to be adjusted in order to account for
the fact that different sets of explananda are acceptable with respect
to different sets of arguments.
As we have mentioned in the introduction, an important virtue of
abstract argumentation is that a basic framework can easily be en-
hanced in various ways. EAFs as presented in this paper clearly provide
an idealized modeling with regard to the subtleties that occur in real
scientific debates. By listing possible enhancements of EAFs we have
suggested in which way a more realistic modeling could be obtained.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented the Explanatory Argumentation Frame-
work (EAF), obtained by enhancing Dung’s Abstract Argumentation
Framework with explanatory capabilities. We have motivated such an
enhancement by pointing out, on the one hand, the close relation
between argumentation and explanation, and on the other hand, the
usefulness of our framework in the modeling of scientific debates. We
have demonstrated that EAFs allow for a dynamic view on explanatory
reasoning by involving both justificatory and explanatory arguments.
The relation to scientific debates has been explicated by showing how
multiple different scientific views can be modeled by making use of
different criteria for selecting arguments. In this way EAFs are able (i)
to model the criticism inherent to scientific debates in terms of counter-
arguments, (ii) to model alternative competing explanations, and (iii)
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to evaluate and compare the explanatory features offered by the com-
peting scientific views. Moreover, different selection procedures that
can model different epistemic and methodological preferences regarding
theory choice can be formulated in our framework.
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